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This brief is the second in a series discussing seamless health care insurance coverage for families lacking 
coverage due to work or life transitions. Our initial brief, Maximizing Health Care Enrollment through Seamless
Coverage for Families in Transition: Current Trends and Policy Implications (by Ken Jacobs, Laurel Lucia, Ann
O’Leary, and Ann Marie Marciarille, released in March 2011), reviewed the literature on the prevalence of 
uninsurance caused by work or life transitions, and provided initial policy recommendations. In this brief, we
provide a more detailed set of recommendations for state and federal policymakers on how best to ensure 
seamless health coverage under the Affordable Care Act for individuals and families who lose health insurance
because of a work or life transition. 
INTRODUCTION
The promise of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is that if someone loses a job or gets divorced, they can still
have affordable health coverage. If someone is forced to retire early for whatever reason, they don’t have
to wait for Medicare to get health coverage. If a young adult graduates from school and is no longer 
covered on a parent’s plan, and she does not have a good job with benefits, she will not be left without
health insurance. 
Making this promise a reality is one of the key challenges of implementation. Past experience with the
state Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), Medicaid expansions, the recent implementation of
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the federal high risk pools (PCIP), and other public programs demonstrates that while outreach and 
education are essential, such efforts alone are not sufficient to assure that those eligible will enroll in the
program. In contrast, very high proportions of those eligible for job-based coverage enroll (over 80% of
those eligible)1 and even higher proportions of those eligible for Medicare enroll (95% or higher).2
Why is take-up of employment-based coverage and Medicare so much higher? Two major factors are the
automatic or nearly automatic nature of enrollment, and the widespread knowledge of the availability of
benefits. In the case of employment-based coverage, the institutional connection between employer and
employee facilitates take-up. Payment is done through a payroll deduction and enrollment is simple and
generally occurs at the time of initial employment. For Medicare Part B, individuals are automatically
enrolled when they turn 65, unless they return a form declining coverage.3 Eligibility is straightforward,
there is no income test to qualify, and there is widespread cultural knowledge about the program. Most
Americans know that people over age 65 get Medicare. 
This policy brief is one element of an implementation effort designed to ensure that individuals who lose
employment-based insurance or for whom insurance in the individual market is no longer affordable can
easily transition to other coverage. This brief builds on earlier efforts to provide seamless coverage among
public programs, but recognizes that less work has been devoted to maintaining health coverage in the
private insurance markets.4 The policy work behind this paper began with this question: How can 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act build on institutional connections and develop widespread
cultural knowledge of the availability of coverage during life transitions that precipitate the loss of private
coverage? 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Americans’ health insurance coverage is not static. People cycle in and out of coverage and between
sources of coverage. Gaps in coverage have real effects on American families; even short bouts of unin-
surance can have long-term impacts on health and family finances. 
Loss of coverage frequently coincides with life transitions like losing a job, changing jobs, moving, or
divorce. The main option for those who lose employment-based coverage, COBRA, is often priced out of
reach for families that have suffered a major loss of income. 
The Affordable Care Act creates an unprecedented opportunity to address the gaps in health coverage
caused by life transitions. Achieving this promise will require attention in federal regulations and actions
by the new health insurance exchanges as well as public health coverage programs, particularly Medicaid
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Just as the ACA relies on the health insurance
exchanges as a single portal to connect individuals to the exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP, throughout this
paper we refer to the “exchanges” in discussing how to connect those who lose employment-based cover-
age to subsidized and unsubsidized coverage through the exchange as well as Medicaid/CHIP. While we
mainly focus on the loss of employment-based coverage, the same considerations will hold for people
who purchase coverage in the individual market outside of the exchanges and later face changing eco-
nomic or life circumstances that make them eligible to receive subsidized coverage through the
exchanges.
This paper makes the following policy recommendations to ensure that all Americans can maintain
health coverage under the ACA—even during complicated life transitions:
Use existing institutions to inform Americans about—and enroll them
in—the health insurance exchanges. 
The triggering events that cause people to lose employer-based coverage often put them into contact with
institutions that can serve as gateways for enrollment into the health insurance exchanges. These include:
the insurance company terminating coverage, the unemployment insurance system or other public 
programs, the educational system, state and local courts in the case of divorce, and departments of motor
vehicles for those who move. Auto-application systems should be implemented by partnering with these
institutions where possible. 
Ensure individuals are able to make informed choices between
COBRA and the health insurance exchanges, and can access the
exchanges with no gaps in coverage. 
Consumers must be informed of the option of enrolling in COBRA or the exchanges at the time of loss of
coverage, and  be provided the tools to determine the best choice for their family. Entities currently
required to provide COBRA notification should be required to provide similar notification about the 
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availability of health coverage through the exchanges. Individuals who drop COBRA should be able 
to take-up coverage in the exchange, and do so without a gap in coverage. State should ultimately 
encourage insurers to offer plan options within the exchanges with similar provider networks to the most
common group plans to ensure continuity of care.
Protect families from having to make unanticipated repayments to
the IRS.
The ACA uses advance tax credits to make health insurance widely affordable, but requires that individ-
uals refund the government if their income increases during the year. The health insurance exchanges
should provide tools to families to best determine subsidy amounts at the time of initial application, 
re-determination for the subsequent calendar years, and re-determination during the year due 
to changes in circumstances. Exchanges should educate enrollees about the importance of promptly
reporting changes in income, and consider the use of government data sources to trigger reminders. 
BACKGROUND
It is well-documented that one of the major sources of gaps in health insurance coverage is work or life
transitions that lead to the loss of employment-based coverage, including unemployment, a reduction in
work hours, divorce, widowhood, and aging off of one’s parents’ coverage.5 Individuals who lose employ-
ment-based insurance risk having a gap in coverage as they transition to a new health plan. In addition,
they risk an interruption in the continuity and quality of health care resulting from changing health plans
or providers. Both problems lead to negative health outcomes as well as the risk of serious financial 
consequences.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) aims to address these gaps in coverage in
several ways, including by providing individuals with affordable coverage options when they are without
employment-based coverage, and by requiring states to create single points of entry and seamlessness
between public programs and the health insurance exchanges. A major emphasis of the ACA and the
accompanying state implementation efforts is to ensure seamlessness primarily among public health
programs, such as Medicaid and CHIP, and the health insurance exchanges. This policy brief will argue
that, in addition, the federal government and states must work together to ensure seamlessness for those
individuals shifting from employment-based coverage or coverage in the individual market to the new
health insurance exchanges and the re-invented Medicaid program. 
This brief will start with a review of the data establishing that individuals facing major life transitions such
as unemployment or the shift from full-time to part-time work often lose health coverage and will be in
need of assistance from the health insurance exchanges. In order to maximize enrollment in coverage, the
federal regulations and state policies must provide for notice and create mechanisms to proactively enroll
these individuals in the health insurance exchanges or relevant public program. One policy challenge will
be to ensure that individuals who are experiencing a major work or life transition that results in a loss of 
coverage are informed of their options, and understand the pros and cons of maintaining coverage
through COBRA versus enrolling in insurance through the exchanges, both subsidized and unsubsidized.
Finally, given that life transitions are also associated with income volatility, individuals will need to be
assisted to ensure the subsidies they may receive are adequate to enable them to purchase coverage at a
time of economic hardship without creating undue liability for repayment when they file their taxes in the
subsequent year, or to assist in enrolling in Medicaid if eligible.
We will make recommendations for federal regulations that minimize barriers to access and affordability
along with state policies to build the architecture needed to create seamlessness between private 
coverage (both employment-based coverage and individual coverage) and the health insurance
exchanges (or other state subsidized health programs).
Ann O’Leary, Beth Capell, Ken Jacobs, and Laurel Lucia    |  OCTOBER 2011        5
6 POLICY BRIEF |  The Promise of the Affordable Care Act, the Practical Realities of Implementation
State Public Health Insurance Programs and Public
Subsidies for Private Coverage: An Eligibility Roadmap
Under the ACA, affordable coverage will be provided through a multitude of public programs and the health insurance
exchanges. Starting in 2014 those adults and families without employment-based coverage will be able to access
health insurance through:
Medicaid: Beginning January 1, 2014, federal law will require coverage of all individuals under age 65 (children, 
parents, and childless adults) with incomes at or below 133 percent of the FPL regardless of disability or other 
categories. The result is an increased number of individuals eligible for Medicaid. By 2016, approximately 16 million
additional Americans will qualify for the expanded Medicaid program and CHIP.6, 7
Subsidized Coverage through Health Insurance Exchanges: Individuals without an offer of afford-
able employment-based coverage will be able to obtain private health insurance through health insurance exchanges.
In a state that does not create a Basic Health Plan, adults over age 18 with incomes 133–400 percent of the FPL will
be eligible for cost-sharing and premium subsidies. Children under age 18 with incomes 133–400 percent of the FPL
will be eligible either for CHIP or exchange subsidies (see below). Adults and children above 400 percent of the 
FPL will be able to purchase private coverage through the health insurance exchanges, but will not be eligible for 
subsidies. 
Premium tax credits (provided in advance in order to allow individuals to purchase health insurance when they need
it) will be available to those individuals who purchase health insurance through the exchanges, earn up to 400 percent
of the FPL, and are not otherwise eligible for other coverage.8 The tax credits will be available on a sliding scale based
on income, providing limits on the percentage of income that people are required to pay for their health premiums for
the year.9 The credits are designed to reduce the premium payments to a pre-determined percentage of participants’
annual income. Additional subsidies will reduce the out-of-pocket costs (such as co-payments and deductibles) to 
further reduce the financial burden on individuals receiving health care. By 2016, approximately 18 million Americans
will qualify for such subsidies through the exchange.10
Unsubsidized Coverage through Health Insurance Exchanges: Individuals without an offer of
affordable employment-based coverage and with incomes above 400 percent of the FPL will also be able to obtain 
private health insurance through the exchanges. The extent to which higher income individuals do so is expected to
vary by state and over time, depending on the nature of the market outside the exchange as well as the ability of 
the exchange to provide insurance products and customer service appealing to higher income individuals who lack
employment-based coverage.
Basic Health Plan: Adults between 133–200 percent of the FPL could qualify for coverage through the 
proposed Basic Health Plan (BHP) if a state chooses to adopt such a plan.11 States choosing to do so will receive 
95 percent of what the federal government would have paid for their coverage through the exchange.12 The remain-
ing 5 percent would presumably be covered by subscriber premiums or by reducing provider reimbursement.13 A state
could choose to administer a Basic Health Plan as an extension of its Medicaid program or as a third program admin-
istered by the exchange, along with the individual market exchange and the SHOP exchange.14
Public Programs for Children: Children in low and moderate income families may qualify either for Medicaid
or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In some states, the CHIP program operates as a Medicaid exten-
sion. In other states, such as California, there is a separate CHIP program (Healthy Families). Income eligibility varies
from state to state in terms of both the minimum income eligibility for the CHIP program as well as the upper limit on
income eligibility. In addition, in many states income eligibility varies by age so that a family may have one child in
Medicaid and another child in CHIP.
A FOCUS ON WHO IS LOSING COVERAGE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
“The uninsured” is not a static population. A study by the U.S. Treasury estimates that nearly half of the
non-elderly population can be expected to go without coverage for some period of time over a decade.15
Individuals may go on and off coverage for a variety of reasons, including gain or loss of employment,
changes in income, moving, and changes in family status.
Many people cycle in and out of coverage over a short period of time. One-half to two-thirds of those who
are uninsured in any given year move into or out of coverage in that year.16 In Massachusetts, approxi-
mately one-quarter of individual market enrollees in the state’s health insurance exchange, the
Connector, enrolled and terminated their coverage within 12 months.17
This is a major design challenge for exchanges: individuals can be expected to shift between the employ-
ment-based insurance market and the exchanges, and to do so for varying lengths of time. Many will
remain in the exchange for less than a year during a transitional period. For others it will be their stable
source of coverage for a number of years. This has important implications for the health insurance
exchanges across a wide range of issues, from the design of the eligibility and enrollment system to the
plan choices and provider networks.
Understanding the prevalence of the life transitions that lead to loss of coverage can help determine how
policy interventions could be targeted to most effectively ensure maintenance of coverage following these
transitions.
New research by economist Lara Shore-Sheppard of Williams College identifies the prevalence of life
transitions at the time of health insurance loss. She analyzed the incidence of certain transitions among
those who have lost coverage and those who maintain coverage. The analysis is based on a sample of
adults ages 19–64 using 2002 data from the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) by
the U.S. Census Bureau. Although the SIPP does not directly identify the cause of coverage loss, Shore-
Sheppard’s analysis indicates the changes that occurred in an individual’s life around the time of the loss
of coverage. 
Shore-Sheppard finds that over the year, 76.6 percent of the individuals surveyed were always insured, 8.4
percent experienced at least one loss of coverage, 10.4 percent were never insured, and 4.6 percent gained
coverage. As shown in Table 1, a loss in coverage frequently coincided with job loss, change in employ-
ment, or moving. Among months in which a coverage loss was observed, 16.2 percent of individuals had
lost a job in the past four months, 22.9 percent were in families in which any family member lost a job,
and 14.2 percent were in families in which the owner of insurance lost a job. Other common life transi-
tions observed during the four months prior to a coverage loss were changing employers (14.0%), moving
(9.6%), and switching from full-time to part-time work (9.0%). The likelihood of having lost a job, changed
employers, or moved was significantly lower in months in which a coverage loss was not observed, but the
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likelihood of having switched from full-time to part-time work was relatively similar regardless of whether
or not a coverage loss was observed. 
For those individuals whose incomes would qualify them for either a public health insurance program or
health insurance premium subsidies in the health insurance exchange, income fluctuations are quite 
dramatic even in non-recessionary times. People who purchased insurance in the individual market may
find the cost of that coverage out of reach and will need access to subsidized coverage through the
exchange in order maintain insurance. Individuals covered through the exchange may experience
changes in both program eligibility and subsidy eligibility due to income fluctuations. 
The Commonwealth Fund recently analyzed data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and found that there is great fluctuation from year to year for individuals who would qualify for
varying public programs or subsidies through the health insurance exchange.18 The data show that in
non-recessionary times (from 2005 to 2006), 17 percent of individuals who had been eligible for subsi-
dized health coverage through the exchange would lose their eligibility due to an increase in family
income (15 percent if the state has a Basic Health Plan) and another 14 percent who had not been eligi-
ble due to family incomes above the income threshold would become eligible either for subsidized cov-
erage through the exchange (12%), the Basic Health Plan (1%), or Medicaid (1%), (Table 2). The majority
of individuals who would be income-eligible for subsidies would remain in the same income level cate-
gory, but many of these individuals could experience income fluctuations within the 133–399 percent FPL
income range that would change the level of subsidies for which they are eligible.
Table 1. Incidence of Life Transitions
Lost job
Lost job
Lost job
Changed employers
Moved
Switched to part-time work
Not re-enrolled
Divorced
Widowed
22.9%
14.2%
16.2%
14.0%
9.6%
9.0%
5.3%
0.4%
0.2%
10.1%
2.5%
4.6%
5.4%
5.5%
7.2%
3.3%
0.3%
0.1%
Life transition in
past 4 months
Source: Lara Shore-Sheppard, unpublished article "Correlates and Triggers of Losing or Changing Insurance” based on analysis of
2002 data from the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) by the U.S. Census Bureau.
NOTE: This data predates the Great Recession; transitions are likely to be greater during economic downturns. 
Month in which a
coverage loss 
was not observed
Month in which a
coverage loss 
was observed 
Any family member
Owner of insurance
Individual
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The data underscore that the health insurance exchange participants should not be thought of as a stable
population. While many will continue from year to year, others will transition in and out of the exchange
due to changes in employment status, family status, or income, while others will move up and down on
the scale of subsidy eligibility.
THE PRACTICALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION: HOW TO
CONNECT INDIVIDUALS TO COVERAGE?
The availability and affordability of health coverage is the first step in providing coverage to individuals
who would otherwise be uninsured. But it is only a first step. We posit that the following must occur for
eligible individuals to obtain coverage through the exchanges or Medicaid/CHIP:
Coverage must be available and affordable. The ACA provides for this with various limits and 
constraints. 
Individuals must be aware that coverage is available and affordable. The ACA provides for 
outreach and education. We suggest numerous instances in which notice to those affected by a
life transition or loss of coverage is appropriate and necessary to build awareness of the avail-
ability of health insurance exchanges and a re-invented Medicaid program. 
Individuals must have the opportunity to connect to coverage. The ACA begins this work by 
providing for a web portal and real-time determination of eligibility but there is much more to do
in state and federal implementation to enroll people who would benefit from coverage. 
Individuals must understand the implications of their choices. The ACA creates a framework for
accomplishing this through the web portal, navigators, and other devices; we suggest that among
Table 2. Income Fluctuations by Percent of Federal Poverty Level
76%
51%
73%
87%
9%
1%
7%
30%
Year 2
Source: Table created by authors based on data from Pamela Farley Short, et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: Maintaining
Coverage, Affordability and Shared Responsibility When Income and Employment Change, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, May 2011.
Below 133% of FPL
133–199% FPL
200–399% FPL
Above 400% FPL
Year 1
No Change
in Income
Decreases 
in Income
Increases
in Income
Below
133%
133–
199%
200–
399%
133–
199%
200–
399%
Above
400%
Income
Level
17%
3%
1% 12%
16% 1%
2%
15%
•
•
•
•
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Health Coverage Options Prior to 2014: COBRA, Private
Insurance, and Public Programs
Prior to the 2014 effective date of most of the ACA provisions, individuals who lose employment-based coverage have
limited options for continuing health coverage: (1) use COBRA to maintain existing coverage through an employer’s
group health insurance plan, and pay the full cost of the insurance premium; or (2) find an alternative form of 
insurance such as through a spouse’s plan, the individual health insurance market, or a public program such as
Medicaid or CHIP. Many individuals are not eligible for coverage through these options, because they are not eligible
for COBRA, dependent coverage, Medicaid or CHIP, or they are denied private insurance coverage in the individual,
non-group market. Even among those who are eligible for other coverage, many cannot afford coverage, whether it is
the spouse’s share of the premium or the full cost of the premium for COBRA or individual coverage. This will change
significantly under the ACA.
COBRA
COBRA (or the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) was enacted in 1986 to address the disproportion-
ately high cost of purchasing individual insurance compared to insurance purchased through a large group, usually an
employer.19 This high cost, and a general lack of portability of coverage from employer-to-employer, made it difficult
for individuals transitioning between jobs to maintain health coverage.20 COBRA’s solution is to provide many (but not
all) employees (and their spouses and dependent children) with a right to coverage at the group rate secured by their
employer if they experience a “qualifying event.” 
Eligibility: COBRA only applies to coverage provided by group health plans for employers with 20 or more employ-
ees. Many states, including California, have laws similar to COBRA which apply to employers with fewer than 20
employees.21
A qualified beneficiary is, generally speaking, an employee (or dependent of an employee) receiving eligible plan 
coverage on the day of a qualifying event. Employees (and their dependents) that are not covered on the date of a
qualifying event are not eligible for COBRA. For employees, qualifying events include termination of employment for
reasons other than gross misconduct, and the reduction in the number of hours of employment. Other qualifying events
include those for spouses—the termination or reduction in hours of a spouse who is a qualified beneficiary, the 
person’s spouse becoming eligible for Medicare, divorce, separation, or death of a spouse who is a qualified benefi-
ciary. Dependent children that lose their dependent status can also use COBRA to maintain their coverage. COBRA is
not available if an employer no longer offers coverage or goes out of business.
Duration: Individuals eligible for COBRA may continue to maintain their group insurance for 18 to 36 months
depending on the qualifying event.22 If the loss of coverage was due to a job loss or reduction in hours, the benefici-
aries are only entitled to 18 months of continued coverage under the group health plan. If, however, the loss of 
coverage was due to a divorce, death, or loss of dependent child status, the beneficiary is entitled to 36 months of
coverage. In California, all beneficiaries are entitled to 36 months of coverage.23
Affordability: Individuals who qualify for COBRA must pay the full cost of the health insurance premiums under the
group health plan. Not only have these individuals lost their employer’s contribution to offset the cost of their health
care premiums, they often have also lost their job or had a significant reduction in their income. As a result, COBRA
coverage is often unaffordable to those that are eligible for it.24
No subsidies are currently available to assist with payment of COBRA coverage. In 2009 the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) provided premium subsidies for COBRA for a short time. Studies of the subsidy showed that
it dramatically increased enrollment in COBRA for those that were eligible to receive it.25 The program ended in May
of 2010 and there are no current plans to provide a similar subsidy program on a continuing basis.
Due to the lack of affordability of COBRA, recent estimates indicate that as few as 14 percent of those eligible for
COBRA coverage accept that coverage.26
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the implications that are worthy of consideration are the choice
between COBRA and the exchange (or Medicaid) as well as the
consequences of reconciliation in a subsequent tax year. 
Finally, we suggest that, in some instances where there is likely
to be a high correlation between an event and lack of coverage
or unaffordability of coverage, an application for ACA coverage
through an exchange or Medicaid be automatically initiated on
behalf of a potentially eligible individual. 
OPTIONS FOR MAINTAINING HEALTH
COVERAGE DURING LIFE
TRANSITIONS UNDER THE ACA
For individuals facing the loss of employment-based coverage due to a
major life or work transition, the ACA provides an alternative to COBRA
to obtain affordable health coverage: Enrolling in health insurance
offered through a health insurance exchange or Medicaid/CHIP, with
subsidies scaled to income for those below 400 percent of the federal
poverty level.
There are four distinct policy challenges that the federal government
and the states must address in helping individuals find and maintain
affordable health coverage after losing employment-based coverage:
First, individuals who are experiencing a major work or life
transition, and the resulting loss of coverage, must be informed
about the availability of health insurance through the
exchanges and the availability of premium and cost-sharing
subsidies (or public programs like Medicaid).
Second, federal regulations and state action must provide
notice to those likely to be eligible and create mechanisms to
proactively enroll these individuals in the health insurance
exchange (or public programs).
Third, individuals must understand the pros and cons of main-
taining their current health coverage through COBRA versus
enrolling in insurance through the health insurance exchanges. 
Alternative
Insurance Options
Individuals who lose employment-
based coverage and either are
not eligible for COBRA or cannot
afford COBRA have limited
options for obtaining insurance
elsewhere. Some may be able to
obtain coverage through a public
program, the individual market,
or a spouse’s employment-based
plan. But economists analyzing
data from the 1996 Medical
Expenditure Survey Panel of the
unemployed found that few indi-
viduals take up these alternative
options.27
Less than 1 percent of COBRA-
eligible individuals and only 8
percent of all job losers had
enrolled in a public health plan
within three months of losing a
job.28 One of the reasons for this
low-take up is that many individu-
als are simply not eligible for
these programs. Prior to the ACA
reforms, public programs for
low-income individuals, such as
Medicaid, have been available
only for parents and children;
adults without children under 18
at home are not eligible under
most circumstances in most
states. Similarly, only 3 percent
of COBRA-eligible individuals and
10 percent of all job losers had
enrolled in another private health
insurance plan.29 This low take-
up is due to the serious barriers
in the individual insurance mar-
ket—barriers that the ACA
attempts to address. For exam-
ple, prior to the ACA, in most
states, insurers could deny cov-
erage in the individual market
due to pre-existing conditions or
impose limitations on coverage
that preclude coverage for the
pre-existing condition, some-
times indefinitely. Finally, even
when an individual has a working
spouse with access to job-based
coverage, the cost of enrolling in
that private coverage may be out
of reach.
•
•
•
•
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Finally, upon entering the exchange individuals must be helped so that they receive the neces-
sary subsidies to purchase coverage but do not become liable for a large amount of repayment at
the end of the year due to changes in income.
(1) More than Just Outreach and Public Education: Institutional 
Connection Points and Automatic Initiation of Application
In considering how best to raise awareness about the health exchanges and connect individuals in life
transitions to coverage, we can learn from the experience of past public health programs. For example,
maximizing children’s enrollment in CHIP and Medicaid programs involved not only extensive outreach
and education about the availability of coverage, but also identifying and utilizing key institutions 
connected to kids. To this end, a number of states used “express lane” eligibility to connect kids on school
lunch programs to Medicaid and CHIP coverage.30 States also encouraged or required K–12 educational
institutions to provide enrollment materials.31 Churches and other religious institutions in many areas
reached out to their congregations.32
In thinking about how to reach individuals when they face life transitions that may result in a loss of 
health coverage, we identified key institutions that connect to individuals with private coverage or with
which they are likely to interact when going through a life transition. These include: 
Employers for employment-based coverage;
Insurers for both employment-based coverage and individual coverage;
Unemployment insurance agencies for the unemployed;
Educational institutions, both K–12 and higher education, annually at times of enrollment and
graduation;
State or local courts for those facing life changes such as divorce or adoption; and
Departments of motor vehicles and the U.S. Postal Service for movers.
In some instances, we suggest that these institutions provide notice. In other instances, we suggest that
these institutions provide a link through their websites to the web portal for health insurance coverage. In
a few instances, we propose that an application for coverage be automatically initiated. 
One of the ways to determine how such efforts should be targeted is to understand where individuals who
are losing health coverage go for other public benefits and services. Economist Lara Shore-Sheppard 
analyzed participation rates in public programs, which suggest potential points for enrollment or notifi-
cation of coverage options. As shown in Table 3, during nearly one-quarter (23.5%) of months in which a
coverage loss was observed, a family member was enrolled in Medicaid. The rate of Medicaid participa-
tion by any family member was similar during uninsured months (24.8%). School food program partici-
pation by a child in the household was also common during months in which a coverage loss was
observed (21.9%) and during uninsured months (24.9%). While a smaller share of those losing coverage
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
were on unemployment insurance (7.1%), UI can provide an important portal for reaching individuals
who lose coverage due to job loss. Another promising point of connection not covered in this analysis is
new enrollment in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly known as food
stamps), which in nearly all cases will coincide with eligibility for Medicaid.
By first focusing on key life events and existing paperwork, we can then modify current procedures to 
better identify the uninsured.33 These could include COBRA notices, other insurance notices, applica-
tions for UI and public benefit programs, applications for community college, divorce, W-4 forms for
withholding of earnings, state income tax forms, health care visits, the annual start of school, change of
address, and children aging off Medicaid/SCHIP.34 During these events, the uninsured individual could
be allowed to indicate: (1) their lack of coverage; (2) a request for the state’s help to obtain coverage; (3) a
request for the state to access otherwise confidential data to determine eligibility; and (4) permission to
be contacted if necessary to establish eligibility.35 A sign-off procedure is necessary to address privacy
concerns and comply with HIPAA requirements for individual consent before data is transferred. 
At a minimum, each of the entry points described above should provide notices on how to obtain health
coverage. Where online applications are used for other public programs, they should include a question
on health insurance and a link directly into the online portal for signing up for coverage in the health
insurance exchanges to the extent permitted by federal law. 
California has pending legislation that would provide notice, web portal links, and, in some instances,
semi-automatic initiation of an application for health coverage through the health insurance exchange
web portal, using some of the institutional connection points described in this section. 
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Table 3. Participation in Public Programs
Medicaid
Women, Infants and Children
Unemployment Insurance
Social Security Insurance
TANF
School food
Housing
Energy assistance
23.5%
9.7%
7.0%
4.2%
0.9%
21.9%
4.9%
2.8%
24.8%
8.4%
4.4%
4.3%
0.7%
24.9%
4.3%
2.2%
Month in which
a coverage loss
was observed
Source: Lara Shore-Sheppard, unpublished article "Correlates and Triggers of Losing or Changing Insurance” based on analysis of
2002 data from the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Month in which private 
coverage (job-based  and 
individual market) 
was observed
Month in which
uninsurance was
observed
Any family member
Child in household
Individual
Public Program
4.5%
1.9%
2.2%
1.1%
0.1%
5.7%
0.9%
0.3%
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Laboratory of the States: California Explorations, Opportunities
for Other States 
California, like many other states, has faced past challenges in assuring that those who were eligible became enrolled in public
programs, including CHIP/Healthy Families, PCIP (the new federal high risk pool), and Medicaid/Medi-Cal. Outreach and public
education have been helpful but not sufficient to achieve take-up comparable to employment-based coverage or Medicare.
Discussion on these issues arose in California during 2007 when the state attempted to enact comprehensive reform on its own.
In 2009–2010, as federal health reform took shape, the urgency of realizing the promise of health reform pushed Health Access
California and other stakeholders to explore opportunities to maximize enrollment in the health insurance exchanges and
Medicaid/Medi-Cal after 2014. 
In 2011, Health Access California sponsored AB 792 by Assemblymember Susan Bonilla, which is designed to take advantage
of institutional connection points for Californians at risk of losing private coverage. This legislation requires:
Notice about the availability of coverage through the health insurance exchange and Medicaid/Medi-Cal;
Website linkage to the health insurance exchange web portal; and 
Automatic filing of an application for coverage (with opt-out opportunities).
The ACA requires the creation of a single web portal that allows individuals to enroll in health insurance exchange coverage, 
subsidized and non-subsidized, as well as in Medicaid or CHIP if the individual is eligible for those programs. The trick is to 
connect individuals who are losing coverage to that process. 
AB 792 establishes notification requirements about the availability of coverage through the health insurance exchange and
Medicaid, creates web portal linkages between state agencies and the exchange web portal, and in some instances requires the
initiation of automatic applications for health coverage through the exchange web portal. The primary focus is on individuals expe-
riencing certain life transitions such as loss of employment or loss of health insurance, but it also addresses additional opportu-
nities to connect persons who have individual coverage to coverage through the health insurance exchange (or public programs).
Insurers—Loss of Employment-Based Health Insurance: State governments regulate a substantial share of
health insurance sold to employers. AB 792 requires state-regulated insurers to provide notice and, with the consent of the 
individual, initiate an application for coverage to the health insurance exchange when there is a loss of employer-based health
insurance. The list of qualifying events is similar but not identical to COBRA qualifying events and applies to employees and
dependents. In California alone, there were an estimated 6.5 million job terminations in 2010,35 with a substantial share of these
individuals losing employment-based coverage at least for a period of time between jobs. As currently drafted, the notice states:
“In March of 2010, the federal government passed national health care reform. Because of this, you may be eligible
for reduced-cost comprehensive health care coverage through the California Health Benefit Exchange. Because you
are losing your coverage from your employer or the employer of a family member, an application will be sent to the
California Health Benefit Exchange to make it easier for you to get health care coverage. Eligibility for reduced-cost
coverage through the California Health Benefit Exchange or no-cost coverage through Medi-Cal is based on your
income. You will be contacted by the Exchange to complete the application. You are not required to accept coverage
from the Exchange. To learn more, or to contact the Exchange, visit www.healthexchange.ca.gov or call 1-888-(insert
telephone number)."
HIPAA and privacy laws more generally are a challenge in automatic initiation of an application since HIPAA requires consent of
the individual to have information transferred from the insurer or employer to the exchange. As currently drafted, AB 792 requires
the insurer to receive the consent of the enrollee to transfer any information. If the information is transferred, it will trigger the
initiation of an application for enrollment in coverage.37 This has the felicitous effect of sorting out those who believe themselves
at risk of being uninsured from those who expect to have continuous coverage (for example, an employee who is going from a
job with coverage to a different employer that also provides coverage). However, obtaining consent creates a barrier to applica-
tion that may diminish take-up by those who need coverage. 
Insurers—Health Coverage in the Individual Market: Research by the California Health Care Foundation under-
taken to support the work of the California Health Benefits Exchange, done while AB 792 was pending, indicates that 58 percent
of the 2.2 million Californians with individual insurance coverage are income-eligible for subsidies through the health insurance
exchange or Medicaid/Medi-Cal.38 Once reform is implemented, individuals who are initially not eligible for subsidies may choose
•
•
•
Ann O’Leary, Beth Capell, Ken Jacobs, and Laurel Lucia    |  OCTOBER 2011        15
coverage in the private market where subsidies are not available. If earnings decline, they may choose to terminate coverage
due to financial hardship. AB 792 requires insurers to provide notice of the availability of subsidies to every purchaser of individ-
ual coverage. AB 792 also requires that when an individual terminates individual coverage, with the consent of the individual, the
insurer must initiate an application for coverage through the health insurance exchange web portal by transferring the individual’s
information to the exchange. Over a million Californians could get more affordable coverage through the exchange or
Medicaid/Medi-Cal as a result of this provision alone.
Unemployment Insurance Agency—Application for UI: This provision would require California’s Employment
Development Department (the state agency that administers the Unemployment Insurance system) to provide notice of the avail-
ability of coverage through the health insurance exchange and Medicaid as well as initiate an application to the exchange auto-
matically whenever an individual applies for Unemployment Insurance. The initial response by the state agency responsible for UI
turned on a very narrow interpretation of federal law governing the use of UI funds, resulting in a cost estimate of millions of 
dollars to the state budget. Further work with the U.S. Department of Labor and the State is needed to determine whether a link-
age can be created similar to what exists between the Social Security Administration and the Medicare program in which 
consumers who apply for one are educated about the availability of the other and the websites provide easy links from one 
program to the other. 
Family Courts—Change in Family Status: Under AB 792, family courts would be required to provide a notice
regarding the availability of affordable health insurance through California’s health insurance exchange to individuals petitioning
for or responding to dissolution of marriage or legal separation and to those petitioning for the adoption of a child. The state
courts worked collaboratively on this effort, perhaps because health insurance is often an issue for those undergoing divorce,
legal separation, or adoption.
Application for State Disability Insurance: When an individual files a claim for disability benefits, the state would
be required to provide a notice to the individual regarding the availability of affordable health insurance through California’s health
insurance exchange. 
K–12 Educational Institutions: The CHIP programs (Healthy Families in California) have explored various means of con-
necting kids to coverage through K–12 schools. Some school districts provide CHIP/Medicaid applications for those in the lower
grades. Some states, including California, have a version of “express lane” eligibility in which kids enrolled in school lunch pro-
grams are offered an opportunity to enroll in CHIP/Medicaid. Similar efforts should be undertaken to reach not only the parents
and other family members of kids on CHIP/Medicaid but also young adults graduating from high school, a life transition highly
correlated with lack of coverage. Health Access is working on further legislative and administrative efforts to accomplish this in
California. One barrier that may be particular to California is that a state law requiring a school district to take action is a state-
mandated local cost that the state budget must pay, a difficult hurdle in these tough budget times for California. However, both
the school lunch program and many California school districts connect kids to CHIP/Healthy Families and Medicaid/Medi-Cal. 
Higher Educational Institutions: Because CHIP eligibility cuts off prior to higher education for most young adults and
because Medicaid in most states does not cover adults without children under 18 at home, little attention has been paid to insti-
tutions of higher education as an institutional point of connection for health coverage programs. Both the creation of health insur-
ance exchanges and the expansion of Medicaid to adults without children at home mean this is now a fertile area for exploration. 
Further work at the state level is needed to explore how best to connect students in institutions of higher learning with coverage.
Given budget cuts to the higher education programs in California, this would need to be done at little or no cost to the higher
education systems. At least some of the institutions of higher education already determine whether a student has coverage or
not. 
Department of Motor Vehicles: Moving is another important indicator of loss of health coverage. The DMV could be
another point of connection to information about the health insurance exchange when individuals file for change of address. This
was not included in the draft legislation, but is worth further exploration.
Not every institutional point of connection will work or will be effective enough to be worth the effort. Health Access California
began with the model of COBRA because the system is in place and it provides an easy foundation upon which to build with little
additional cost. The requirements on individual insurance are an extension of practices already in place with COBRA.
Unemployment Insurance provides an obvious point of entry due to the correlation of job loss with lack of health coverage.
Building on the work of linking children to CHIP (and Medicaid), the role of educational institutions as connection points for 
individuals in life transition is worth exploring as well. 
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Recommendation:
Exchanges should work with existing institutions that reach individuals at the time of life transitions to
ensure that these individuals are notified of the opportunities for affordable coverage made possible
through the ACA and connected to enrollment. Where online applications are used for public services
individuals are likely to touch during transitions that lead to a loss of health insurance, direct links should
be provided to online portals for applying for coverage in the exchange, Medicaid, or CHIP. States should
require state-regulated insurers to provide notification to consumers about the option of enrolling in
Medicaid and the exchange when job-based coverage is terminated. Auto-application should be used to
the extent practicable. 
(2) Staying Covered: COBRA or the Health Insurance Exchange?
When an employee or dependent loses employment-based coverage, most employees will have the
choice of either continuing group coverage through COBRA (if eligible) or enrolling in health insurance
through the exchanges or Medicaid/CHIP. In order to ensure awareness and appropriate uptake of 
coverage through the exchanges, four barriers to enrollment must be addressed:
COBRA should not close the door to enrollment in coverage
through a health insurance exchange.
When an individual experiences a loss of health coverage due to a life transition, such as job loss,
reduction in hours, or divorce, the ACA provides a special enrollment period to allow these indi-
viduals to enroll in health insurance through the exchanges.39 Many of these individuals will
qualify for both COBRA and health insurance through the exchanges, and so will need to choose
one or the other forms of coverage. If an individual chooses COBRA, the proposed regulations
seem to indicate that the individual may not be able to enroll in the exchange until the exhaus-
tion of the COBRA period.40 The problem posed by the current draft of the regulations is further
exacerbated by the fact that when an individual enrolls in health insurance through the exchange,
the effective date of coverage is either the first day of the following month or the first day of the
second month if enrollment occurs after the 22nd of the month.41 This means that an individual
who cannot go without health insurance (e.g., an individual receiving cancer treatments) may
choose to enroll in COBRA, but could then be precluded from enrolling in health insurance
through the exchange.
Furthermore, the proposed regulations allow individuals to enroll in health insurance through
the health insurance exchange if the employee’s eligible employer-sponsored health coverage is
no longer affordable.42 But the regulations are not clear on whether individuals who take advan-
tage of COBRA after losing a job, rather than immediately enrolling in health insurance through
the exchange, would be allowed to later enroll in health insurance through the exchange if the
coverage is no longer affordable. 
Recommendation: 
In order to maximize affordable enrollment options for those individuals losing employment-
based coverage, the regulations should be clarified to ensure that individuals who choose COBRA
may later enroll in health insurance through the exchange—via a special enrollment 
period —if the individual drops enrollment in COBRA coverage or if COBRA is deemed unafford-
able. Further, the timing of the effective date of enrollment should be modified to avoid any gaps
in coverage. This could be achieved through two changes: First, by making coverage retroactive
to the enrollment date, and second by allowing for pre-enrollment in advance of a known quali-
fying event while an individual still retains insurance, with the effective date of coverage in the
health insurance exchange starting at the time coverage through the current source ends. 
Consumers must be informed of the option of enrolling in the
health insurance exchange and understand the implications of
choosing COBRA rather than enrolling in health insurance
through an exchange. 
Recommendation: 
Federal regulations and state laws (or regulations) should be revised to require that consumers
who would otherwise receive federal or state COBRA notice also receive notice of the availability
of coverage through an exchange. Such notices should further alert consumers that if they choose
COBRA, there may be limitations on the circumstances under which they can enroll in the health
insurance exchange and what those limitations are. In addition, states should incorporate this
message into public education campaigns about enrolling in health insurance through the
exchanges.
Consumers must be provided with information to make an
informed choice about the cost implications and the implications
for maintaining coverage after loss of employment-based 
coverage.
The ACA requires health insurance exchanges to develop an Internet portal that will provide
information about health insurance plans available through the exchange and the premium tax
credits and cost-sharing reductions.43 In addition, the ACA requires health insurance exchanges
to make available an electronic calculator to help individuals determine the actual cost of cover-
age after the premium tax credit and cost-sharing reductions.44 If health insurance exchanges are
going to effectively serve individuals losing employment-based coverage, exchanges should 
help individuals losing employment-based coverage determine the cost-benefit calculation of
choosing COBRA coverage over choosing subsidized coverage through the exchanges.
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Recommendation for health insurance exchanges:
Exchanges should provide information that will guide individuals in choosing COBRA or insur-
ance offered through the exchanges. Individuals will need information about the comparison of
costs between the two options, but will also need information to determine whether insurance
offered through the exchange will allow them to continue to see the same providers. This infor-
mation should be incorporated into their exchange Internet portal, exchange calculator, and 
outreach and education campaign as appropriate.
Recommendation for federal regulators: 
The federal regulations should be modified to encourage health insurance exchanges to provide
information on comparisons between COBRA and coverage offered through the exchanges, both
subsidized and unsubsidized. Even higher income consumers, those above 400 percent of the
FPL, will be able to obtain coverage through a health insurance exchange, but a silver plan with
an actuarial value of 70 percent will have very different cost sharing than the typical employer
plan, which has an actuarial value closer to 83 percent.45 Consumers will need to be educated
about these basic parameters in addition to having available more precise details for those 
consumers who find it useful.
States should consider whether they can encourage or drive
insurance carriers to offer to individuals within the health insur-
ance exchanges some plan options with similar networks to
those offered in the employer group markets. 
The most seamless option for individuals losing employment-based coverage would be a product
with a similar or identical provider network found through the health insurance exchange. Given
the disparity in the actuarial value between the exchange silver plan and the average employer
plan, as well as the cost sharing and premium subsidies that vary based on income, it is unlikely
that consumers will have precisely the same product with the same cost sharing that they had
with their employer, but it is more likely that they will have the same or similar networks of
providers. States will face design choices in balancing seamlessness between Medicaid coverage
and the health insurance exchange, and between employment-based coverage and exchange
coverage. Provider networks can vary significantly between Medicaid managed care plans and
group coverage even within the same commercial insurer.46 For example, in California, major
commercial insurers that contract with Medicaid/Medi-Cal use different provider networks for
Medicaid managed care than for commercial business, and a major integrated health plan, Kaiser
Permanente, has a very small share of the Medicaid managed care market but a very large share
of the commercial market. Because of low Medicaid reimbursement rates, other states may also
face a mismatch between Medicaid managed care provider networks and provider networks for
commercial plans. One possible solution is for those states with licensed Medicaid managed care
plans to include both the dominant such plan in each geographic area in the exchange as well as
the commercial insurers with the networks used for employment-based coverage. 
(3) Getting the Subsidies Right—Creating a System to Allow 
Individuals to Qualify for Premium Subsidies Based on 
Existing Circumstances and Incomes
Once an applicant reaches a state health exchange, the health insurance exchange will assist the individ-
ual in enrolling in a health insurance plan that best meets the need of that individual and his or her fam-
ily, and will also work to ensure that the individual receives health insurance premium subsidies in order
to afford health insurance.
Federal subsidies are a centerpiece of the ACA’s mission to improve the affordability of health care by 
providing financial assistance to Americans purchasing health insurance through the exchanges.47 It is
estimated that up to 20 million people will receive subsidies through the health insurance exchanges by
2021.48 Health insurance exchange subsidies are provided in the form of advanced payments on tax 
credits. Any advance payment received in a given year must then be reconciled with the tax credits for
which they are found eligible after they have reported their income on their tax return.49 Depending on
family income, a portion or all of the overpayment must be re-paid when taxes are filed (see box below for
amounts). 
Determining eligibility for advance premium tax credits under the ACA is based on the prior year’s
income as reported on the prior year’s tax return, or projected annual income if there has been a change
in income from the prior year.50 The ACA required the U. S. Secretary of Health and Human Services to
develop procedures for making premium tax credit eligibility determinations based on changed circum-
stances, which include the types of life and work transitions we are focused on here: substantial changes
in income, changes in family size or household circumstances, changes in tax filing status, and the filing
of an application for unemployment insurance.51
The potential for overpayment or underpayment will be especially acute for individuals who lose or gain
employment during the course of the year or have major changes in income or changes in family size. If
an individual has a significant increase in earnings or a child leaves home and is no longer a dependent
and it is not reported and processed in a timely manner, they may face a large repayment at the end of the
year. This is especially acute for those near the 400 percent of the federal poverty level threshold. If an
individual has a decrease in income or adds a dependent, reporting changes will have in important
impact on the affordability of coverage and their ability to access better cost-sharing subsidies through
insurance plans in the exchange that are available to people with lower income levels. If an individual is
unemployed at the start of the year and obtains a new job and job-based coverage later in the year, they
could face a repayment if they do not take the subsidies they have already received into account in deter-
mining their tax withholding at the new job. COBRA coverage may be more appropriate for those with
higher incomes who face a relatively brief transition between one source of coverage and another because
the individual would not face a repayment penalty; the individual needs to be able to make an accurate
determination as to the relative costs of such a choice. 
Federal regulations and state implementation of the health insurance exchanges should work to 
minimize repayment shocks while maximizing coverage. 
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Health Insurance Exchange Subsidies and Tax Liabilities
Under the ACA, health insurance exchange subsidies are advanced payments on tax-credits. The ACA further requires that any
advance payment received in a given year must then be reconciled with the tax credits that they are found eligible for after they
have reported their income on their tax return.52 Cost-sharing reductions in the exchange are not subject to reconciliation. Tax 
liability arises if the advance payments exceed the credit for which individuals are ultimately found eligible, as the ACA requires a
portion of the overpayment (or potentially the entire amount) to be repaid.53 This is particularly troubling as many individuals’
incomes fluctuate during the year, and certain job losses or gains can be unpredictable.54 Congress has changed the law twice
since the passage of the ACA with respect to subsidy reconciliation. The most recent change in April 2011 raised the repayment
caps for those under 400 percent of the federal poverty level, and removed the cap entirely on those over 400 percent of the
federal poverty level. The final changes were made in order to cover the cost of repealing a business tax reporting requirement
included in the original legislation.
Under the current repayment requirements, families with incomes below 200 percent of the FPL will be required to pay back up
to $600 in premium tax credit overpayments; families with incomes between 200 and 300 percent of the FPL will be required to
pay back up to $1,500 in overpayments; families with incomes between 300 and 400 percent of the FPL will be required to pay
back up to $2,500 in overpayments; and those making above 400 percent of the FPL will have to pay back the entire amount of
overpayment regardless of the amount. Individuals will be required to pay back up to half the amount families owe.
Changes in marital status could also result in overpayments requiring reconciliation. The proposed IRS regulations recognize that
there may be a need to provide relief to individuals who owe an overpayment because their household income increased due to
a marriage during that tax year and one or both individuals received subsidies prior to marriage. The regulations also propose
special rules for taxpayers who divorce. Taxpayers who divorce during the tax year may agree to allocate premiums and subsi-
dies between themselves. If the taxpayers do not agree on an allocation, the default is that 100 percent of the premiums and
subsidies are allocated to the enrolled spouse in cases in which only one of the former spouses was enrolled and the allocation
is split between spouses in all other cases.55
The repayment requirements create a challenge for health insurance exchange eligibility and enrollment. If a family’s income
increases even modestly over the course of the year, the family may be at potential risk of a financial shock at the time of tax 
filing. In case of non-payment of the overage, a three-month grace period is allowed before coverage would be discontinued. The
IRS has also indicated that penalties may be charged along with the repayment amount in accordance with current law on under-
payment of taxes.
Those likely to receive the greatest income shocks due to underestimation of income are those whose incomes go over the 400
percent FPL “cliff,” since they will be liable for the entire cost of the subsidy, and older families, since the cost of coverage and
amount subsidized at any given income level increases with age.
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that a middle-class family of four with an income between 350 and 400 
percent of federal poverty, one member of which is 55 years old, would receive a subsidy of $11,400 toward the cost of 
coverage.56 A small increase in income would result in a required full repayment of the subsidy, which is equivalent to 13 to 15
percent of their annual income. At the other end of the income spectrum, a required repayment of $600 may be a significant sum
for a family with an income under 200 percent of the federal poverty level.
The perceived risk of being required to repay subsidies may result in reduced take-up of coverage in the health insurance
exchange, especially for lower income families. Concern about repayment risk has been cited57 as one of the reasons for low
take-up rates for the Advance Earned Income Tax Credit (AEITC). A study from the U.S. Government Accountability Office found
that from 2002 through 2004 both the use of AEITC and the amount paid out by employers was quite low: Only about 3 percent
of those potentially eligible claimed advance payments, and about half of those received $100 per year or less.58
The individuals or families who are most likely to decline insurance in favor of paying a lesser penalty for non-coverage are also
the ones most likely to be in good health at the time that insurance is declined. Removing healthy people from the health insur-
ance exchanges’ insurance pools will make the pools less healthy in general, and that effect could drive up premium rates 
overall.59 Large repayments could also undermine public support for the ACA.
Addressing this issue will be important for the success of ACA implementation and for supporting seamless access to health 
coverage through life transitions.
The federal regulations proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) seek to 
minimize overpayments “through a strong initial eligibility process that maximizes accuracy and a strong
process by which individuals can report changes that occur during the year.” The regulations contribute
to that goal by allowing an applicant to accept subsidies that are lower than the amount they are eligible
for, in order to reduce the risk of overpayment. When individuals attest that their annual household
income has increased or is reasonably expected to increase (compared to prior tax returns), exchanges
will accept their application without further verification required.60
However, the regulations must be further strengthened and exchanges should take additional steps in
order to reduce the prevalence of overpayments. The re-determination process in the proposed HHS 
regulations “relies primarily on the individual to provide the exchange with updated information during
the benefit year, as opposed to having the exchange examine electronic data sources and/or contact the 
individual in order to determine whether a change has occurred during the year.”61 The exchanges should
play a more active role in identifying individuals with changes in income or household members, encour-
aging those individuals to report changes and helping them to make appropriate timely adjustments to
their subsidies.
Recommendations:
The health insurance exchanges should provide tools to families to assist in projecting annual
income at the time of initial application and to re-determine amounts over the course of the year
as circumstances change, as is done with federal tax withholding and estimated taxes. The
exchanges should make calculators available that take into account current income and earnings
during the year prior to unemployment or a major change in income or in family status. The
exchanges’ help lines, navigators, and brokers should be trained to aid individuals in under-
standing their options and determining their projected income. Exchanges will need to have the
agility to re-determine subsidy levels over the course of the year upon request of the consumer.
The process for making changes should be simple and the exchanges should be required to act
on reported changes in a timely manner. 
Consumers with subsidized coverage will need to know to report changes in income to the health
insurance exchange. Exchanges should educate enrollees about the importance of promptly
reporting changes in income. Along with notifying participants at the time of enrollment, this will
need to be a broader focus of public education about the exchanges. As considered in the 
proposed HHS regulations, exchanges should offer enrollees the option to be periodically
reminded to report any changes that have occurred. Individuals should be able to report income
changes at any time by logging in to the exchange website and providing updated information.
Individuals should be able to report changes in income that are below the 20 percent threshold
required in law. Regulations should clarify that changes in family size can be reported mid-year
and advanced tax payments and cost-sharing subsidies adjusted accordingly.
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Government data sources could be used to trigger reminders to report significant income
changes. States have data on individuals’ employment and earnings through filings to state
employment agencies, and exchanges should be authorized to use this data. Research is needed
to investigate the prevalence of the problem and the cost-effectiveness of data matching to 
identify individuals who could face potential overpayments. 
CONCLUSION
The ACA offers great promise for expanding access to health coverage and minimizing the gaps in 
coverage caused by changes in life circumstances. Much attention has been paid to ensuring seamless
coverage between Medicaid and the health insurance exchanges. Less attention has been paid to the 
transitions between the exchanges and employment-based coverage. COBRA does not provide a viable
alternative for many of those who lose job-based coverage due to its high cost in a time of reduced
income. 
In order to maximize coverage under the ACA, federal regulations should be modified to ensure that 
the health insurance exchanges are viable options for individuals who lose job-based coverage while 
liabilities for repayment are minimized. Health insurance exchanges will need to insure that individuals
are aware of their options and have the information, tools, and supports they need to make informed
decisions. 
Analyzing triggering events of loss of coverage will help in developing strategies to identify and enroll
individuals who lose coverage. Notification will not be enough. States must also create mechanisms for
auto-application to maximize enrollment. Finally, states will need systems in place to aid individuals in
correctly determining subsidy levels and minimizing repayments.
By doing so, implementation of the health insurance exchanges can meet the promise of the ACA.
•
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